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EQUITY JURISDICTION IN PROBATE MATTERS
UNDER THE NEW CODE
(SUPPLEMENT TO 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309)
JUDGE LESLIE A. WELCH*
Since the publication of the article on the above captioned subject
in 1961 Washington University Law Quarterly 309 two more appellate
court opinions indicate the continuing uncertainty, and thus emphasize
the need for early clarification by the Missouri Supreme Court of pro-
bate court equitable jurisdiction under the new probate code. They
are the Mathews case1 by the Supreme Court in May, 1963, and the
Myers case2 by the St. Louis Court of Appeals one month later. Such
jurisdiction was considered to a limited extent in each case. In
Mathews the subject was discussed but it was held unnecessary in
that case to decide the extent of the broadened equity powers. Myers
held that under the new code the probate court had jurisdiction to
adjudge that a decedent was not the owner but was a mere trustee of
money in his possession or control and to enforce the trust if the
decedent kept the money in "a separate fund established capable of
identification, either in a bank account or elsewhere," 3 but if he had
commingled the trust money with his own, the probate court had no
jurisdiction to enforce the trust. Such distinction appears to be ex-
pressly contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in Lolordo4
where a discovery proceeding in the probate court was certified to the
circuit court (presumably as authorized by Section 481.130) and
hence the circuit court had no greater jurisdiction than the probate
court. There, a commingled bank account was impressed with the
trust of decedent's money. And this even before the new code.
Furthermore, Lolordo was cited approvingly on the subject of probate
court equity jurisdiction in Mathews. Hence, detailed examination of
Mathews, Myers and Lolordo seems called for here.
IJn Mathews, the plaintiff-executor filed an action in the circuit court
alleging that defendants had agreed with the deceased, Martha White,
that upon her causing defendant Esther White's name to be added as
joint depositor in certain bank accounts then in Martha's name, the de-
fendants would not draw from said accounts except to pay Martha's
*Probate Judge, Jackson County, Missouri.
1. Mathews v. Pratt, 367 S.W.2d (Mo. 1963).
2. Inre Estate of Myers, 368 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
3. Id. at 932.
4. Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 88 S.W.2d 353 (1935).
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bills, and that upon Martha's death they would hold the accounts in
trust and distribute such trust funds as provided in Martha's will.
The petition prayed that in equity and good conscience "a resulting
trust be adjudged"5 and the funds be ordered paid over to Martha's
estate.
The circuit court sustained defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's
petition, the defendant's position being "that the exclusive remedy of
plaintiff lay in the Probate Court in a proceeding for the discovery of
assets."6 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of dis-
missal and held that the circuit court had at least concurrent juris-
diction, the court declining to decide in that case whether under the
new code the probate court also had the same jurisdiction in a dis-
covery proceeding under Section 473.340. (No such proceeding was
pending when the circuit court action was tried.)
The Supreme Court opinion, after citing certain cases antedating
the new code which declared that probate courts were without
power to establish, declare, enforce, or execute trusts, and the Frech7
and Stark8 cases (postdating the new code) also so holding or de-
claring, stated:
However, even before the new Code, it would be inaccurate to
say that the probate courts had no equity powers or jurisdiction.
See for instance, Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 88 S. W. 2d. 353;
Hoffmann v. Hoffmann's Executor, 126 Mo. 486, 29 S. W. 603;
State ex rel. Stetina v. Reynolds, 286 Mo. 120, 227 S. W. 47;
Equity Jurisdiction in Probate Matters under the New Code,
Leslie A. Welch, Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol.
1961, No. 4. We must now note §473.030, R.S.Mo. 1959, V.A.M.S.
(Laws 1955), which reads in part as follows: "The court has the
same legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction and
to enforce its orders, judgments and decrees in probate matters
as the circuit court has in other matters. . . ." We have no
occasion here to construe that section, nor shall we do so. We
merely call attention to it. It was ignored in Frech, supra, but it
was discussed later in Stark. The proper time and place will
come for an adequate construction of the section, but this case
presents neither, for this appeal does not arise from probate
action or assumed probate jurisdiction.9
We hold that this is a suit in equity to establish and enforce a
trust, and that the Circuit Court had inherent jurisdiction; also,
that the petition properly stated a claim. It may be that the
Probate Court would have the power to do the same things in a
5. Mathews v. Pratt, 367 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo. 1963).
6. Id. at 633.
7. Inr e Frech's Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1961).
8. Stark v. Moffit, 352 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
9. Mathews v. Pratt, 367 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Mo. 1963).
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discovery proceeding under the existing Code, contrary to what
has so long been declared. We do not so decide here. In such
event, however, the probate jurisdiction could only be concurrent,
for the inherent jurisdiction of our circuit courts to establish,
declare and enforce trusts may certainly not be foreclosed by
probate jurisdiction or proceedings. The petition here was
erroneously dismissed. 0
In Myers, the Laclede Gas Company filed petition under Section
473.357 in the probate court. It provides a procedure in the probate
court to recover property wrongfully withheld by an executor or
administrator, in contrast to the procedure authorized by Section
473.340, to recover property wrongfully withheld from an executor or
administrator. The action was tried both in the probate and circuit
courts on a stipulation of facts. The probate court found against the
Gas Company, the circuit court found for it. On appeal the court of
appeals reversed, holding the case involved equitable issues not within
the jurisdiction of the probate court. The facts were stipulated and
apparently there was no dispute as to the substantive law.
Myers, a storekeeper in outlying St. Louis, agreed in writing to
act as agent for the Gas Company, to collect its bills, keep account of
all moneys collected, keep them separate from his own and to "hold
in trust" such moneys until paid to the petitioner. At Myers' death,
his unpaid collections were $1423.44 which he had deposited in a bank
account subject to withdrawal upon checks by "Myers Hardware
Company by John W. Myers, or Florence E. Myers." After the death
of Myers, his widow Florence issued and delivered to the Gas Com-
pany checks for $1423.44, but the drawee bank returned them unpaid
because of the death of Myers. He had no other bank account and his
business and personal bills were paid by checks drawn upon it. The
account balance at his death was $2945.29.
The Myers opinion relies principally upon Frech and Stark.11 From
Frech it quotes the statement that "the Probate Court lacks jurisdic-
tion in matters involving trusts and trustees."'' 2 It cites with apparent
reliance old cases containing broad declarations that the probate court
has "no power to establish, declare, enforce or execute trusts."''  How-
ever, in its summary the court says that Section 473.357 "would have
application" and the probate court would have power to determine
the equitable issues pertaining to the existence, enforcement and
10. Id. at 637. For discussion of concurrent jurisdiction, see p. - infTa. [Page
9 of article]
11. For a detailed discussion of what it is respectfully suggested were infir-
mities in Frech, including the ignoring of the new code and the reliance upon
questionable old cases, see 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 323 n.76, 324 n.78.
12. In Te Estate of Myers, 368 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Mo. 1963).
13. Id. at 931.
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execution of a trust provided that the trust fund is "capable of identi-
fication." For the court's summary says:
Summing up what we have said, we find that §473.357, supra,
is not applicable to petitioner's action for the reason there is no
such identifiable sum of money in the estate of decedent as de-
scribed in petitioner's petition. If there had been a separate fund
established capable of identification, either in a bank account or
elsewhere, this section would have application. Under the plead-
ings and stipulated facts in this case the Probate Court would
have had to determine the existence of a trust and then proceed
to trace and recover the trust funds. This it cannot do, so the
Supreme Court said in the case of In re Frech's Estate, supra,
and Howard's Estate v. Howe, supra, a principle of law which
we followed in Dietrich v. Jones, supra, and in Stark v. Moffit,
supra.1'
Such "summing up" calls for comparison with the expressly stated
views of the supreme court. Excerpts from the Lolordo opinion
authoritatively and clearly show such views. The opinion stated that
the defendant in his answers to the interrogatories in the discovery
proceeding, admitted that he "sold the properties mentioned at fore-
closure sales as trustee," 15 and further stated that the defendant-
trustee "admitted that he received the proceeds of these two proper-
ties and did not turn these proceeds over to the administrator, but put
them in his own bank account with his own personal funds and that
they were not all used for the benefit of the estate."16 "[I]t is a well-
established rule that when a trustee has received and commingled
trust funds with his own funds, it is presumed in the absence of a
contrary showing, that the trust funds are still there, and it will be
considered that what was paid out of the commingled funds for other
than trust purposes was paid out of the trustee's personal funds and
not out of the trust money, and that all the rest remains as trust
funds ;117 in short that the balance was subject to the trust-to the
extent of the amount of the trust fund. The opinion on the Motion
to Transfer to Court En Banc, concluded: "This court has held
(as have the Courts of Appeals) that, where specific personal property
of an estate has been sold and the proceeds deposited in the
bank account of the seller, the summary proceeding to discover assets
is a proper remedy to compel him to pay the amount of the proceeds
to the estate, and that this remedy is not 'confined to a particular fund
-the actual money which belonged to the decedent.' ,,18
Thus, the Myers view that an "identifiable sum of money" is essen-
14. Id. at 932.
15. Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 1100, 88 S.W.2d 353, 354 (1935).
16. Id. at 1105, 88 S.W.2d at 357-58. (Emphasis added.)
17. Id at 1106, 88 S.W.2d at 358.
18. Id. at 1110, 88 S.W.2d at 360.
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tial to probate court jurisdiction to enforce the trust appears im-
possible to harmonize with the Supreme Court views in Lolordo.
The former article in this Law Quarterly pointed out that the
supreme court, in a line of cases decided before the new code, par-
ticularly those cited approvingly by the Supreme Court in Mathews,"0
culminating with the Stetina, case by the court en banc, firmly estab-
lished the proposition that, in a claim against an estate, a claimant
could, in the probate court obtain a general judgment against the
estate for trust assets shown to be in the possession of the decedent.
If such claimant could, before the new code, recover such a "general
judgment" for the wrongful withholding of trust assets, may he not,
under provisions of the new code, go further and obtain a judgment
finding that he was equitably entitled to all or such part of a com-
mingled fund as equaled his trust money, i. e., that he was the
"owner" thereof? The pertinent sections of the new code point to an
affirmative answer to that questions. The sections most pertinent are
Section 472.030, a general grant to the probate court of equitable
powers to effectuate its jurisdiction in probate matters, followed by
Sections 473.233. (7), 473.340, and 473.357. 20 They should be read
together. Section 472.030 provides:
The court has the same legal and equitable powers to effectuate
its jurisdiction and to enforce its orders, judgments and decrees
in probate matters as the circuit court has in other matters....
Section 473.233 (1) (7) provides:
All property possessed but not owned by the decedent at his
death shall be listed in the inventory, but separately from other
property, together with a statement as to the knowledge of the
executor or administrator as to its ownership....
Section 473.357 granted jurisdiction and provided procedure for
recovery of personal property wrongfully withheld by an executor or
administrator from the "owner." It complements the jurisdiction and
procedure long since provided by Section 473.340 for recovery of "any
19. Mathews v. Pratt, 367, S.W.2d 632, 635 (Mo. 1963).
20. For other new statutes relating to probate court equitable jurisdiction see
1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 325-29. Also collaterally pertinent are §§ 472.020 and
456.225, the latter enacted in 1961. Section 472.020 contains a general grant ofjurisdiction "of the administration of testamentary trusts." In 1961, the legis-
lature, evidently believing that an implementing statute was necessary to make
the general grant effective, enacted § 456.225. It delineates such jurisdiction and
prescribes the procedure for its exercise. This action by the legislature obviously
emanated from its conception that the matter of devolution of property from a
testator to the objects of his bounty in a trust created by his will might soundly
be determined by it to be a probate matter-as legislatures in at least twenty-six
other states have so determined. See 1961 WAsH. U.L.Q. 309, 329 n.99.
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personal property of the decedent" which "any person has concealed
or embezzled or is otherwise wrongfully withholding from the executor
or administrator."
The property required to be listed by paragraph (7) of Section
473.233 (1) would clearly include "trust funds." If the executor or
administrator does not deem such trust funds to be "owned" by an-
other, but lists them as assets of the deceased's estate, Section 473.357
provides a specific remedy available to the owner. It says that if the
petitioner alleges that he is the "owner of personal property described
therein, and that it is in the possession of the executor or adminis-
trator . . ." and that the same is "wrongfully withheld from him,"
the court may determine the title thereto "and order the property to
be delivered to him if he is found to be such owner." This section does
not say it is applicable only when the executor or administrator admits
the property belongs to the other party; neither does it say expressly
or impliedly that the property had to be "earmarked" by the decedent
as the claimant's property, nor does it say that the property has to be
"legally" owned by such claimant. It is broad enough to cover any
kind of owner, legal or equitable.
A perfect analogy is found in Stetina on the probate court's juris-
diction over "equitable" claims.21 If, in Stetina, the court could say
that the probate court's jurisdiction over all claims against an estate
embraced a claim generally regarded as "equitable" in nature, so, in
the Myers case, should not the court have held that Section 473.357
did not distinguish between "legal" and "equitable" claims of title,
especially when considered in conjunction with Section 473.030?
When Section 472.030 is read in conjunction with Section 473.233
(1) (7) and Sections 473.357 and 473.340 the net seems to be: If per-
sonal property is wrongfully withheld by or from an executor or ad-
ministrator, the probate court has jurisdiction of a proceeding to
restore it to its rightful owner and has the same "legal and equitable
powers to effectuate its (that) jurisdiction ... as the Circuit Court
has in other matters." Would not a denial of power to decide equitable
issues and grant equitable relief in proceedings over which jurisdic-
tion was expressly granted by the sections last mentioned, in effect
delete the words "equitable powers" from Section 472.030?
When the 1955 legislature reenacted the discovery statutes without
change and contemporaneously enacted Section 472.030, 473.233 (1)
(7) and 473.357, may it not be inferred that it did so because of the
inability to reconcile Lolordo, Hoffmann, Stetinm with other opinions
declaring that when a trust or other equitable issue is involved the
21. State ex rel. Stetina v. Reynolds, 286 Mo. 120, 227 S.W. 47 (1920).
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probate court has no jurisdiction?22  (See 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309,
317-25 for detailed discussion of such "other opinions" the principal
ones being Wolf and Clay County Bank .23) In short, can it not be
further inferred that after such enactments the drafters of the new
code and the legislature believed that Wolfe, Orr and the like would
have no more than historical significance?
THE RATIONALE OF THE SUBJECT
This is to supplement the discussion on rationale and practicality
in 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 329, 331.
Practicality seems to be all on the side of probate court equitable
jurisdiction. At the outset, take for example the Myers case. Ad-
mittedly $1423.44 of the commingled bank account of $2945.29 was
impressed with a trust. Said the opinion, "When a person holds
property in a fiduciary capacity and mixes his own property with it
so that it cannot be separated nor the amount of each ascertained,
the whole becomes both at law and at equity the property of the trust
estate. No one will quarrel with this statement of law, which has been
announced in innumerable other cases, but it in no way can act as
support for a contention that the Probate Court can determine and
settle this purely equitable problem." 24 The law and the stipulated
facts obligated the administrator to pay $1423.44 to the cestui que
trust. That was clearly true whether or not estate assets were suffi-
cient to pay general creditors. Some court had the duty of merely
ordering the administrator to pay that $1423.44 to the equitable
owner. Why not the probate court? Is anyone benefited by the philos-
ophy denying probate court jurisdiction?
But suppose that in these equity issue cases the facts or substantive
law, or both, are in controversy. Still, the vast majority of such con-
troversies in estates of decedents, minors or incompetents are finally
disposed of in the probate courts. By far the most of them are too
22. Hoffmann v. Hoffmann's Ex'r, 126 Mo. 486, 29 S.W. 603 (1895).
23. State ex rel. Clay County State Bank v. Waltner, 346 Mo. 1138, 145 S.W.2d
152 (1940); State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo. 580, 122
S.W. 2d 909 (1938); Orr v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 291 Mo. 383, 236 S.W. 642
(1921). Clearly, the "co-depositor" held the legal title; necessarily the holding
was that he held as trustee.
It is interesting to note that in In re Kaimann's Estate, 229 S.W.2d 527 (Mo.
1950) Judge Storckman (before he became judge), on behalf of an heir, filed in
the probate court (and prevailed in) a discovery action claiming that the estate
was the real owner of a joint bank account because the funds deposited were
owned by the deceased and the surviving "co-depositor" was a fiduciary who had
not overcome the presumption that the deceased had not made a gift of the funds
to him.
24. In re Estate of Myers, 368 S.W.2d 925, 931-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963).
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small to induce or justify the expense and other burdens of a circuit
court suit. 5 But if a party does feel aggrieved, his right to appeal
and to trial de novo in the circuit court should protect him from the
errors of the probate judge, be he layman or lawyer, wise or unwise,
whether his "conscience be large or narrow," or "his foot be long,
short or indifferent."
Furthermore, let's face it-as stated in the former article-the
real basis for restricting or denying equitable jurisdiction to probate
courts under previous constitutions (frequently in controversies
clearly pertaining to probate matters or business) was the view (fre-
quently correct) that such court was "not required to know any law,
and does not know any more than the law requires, ' 26 and equitable
questions were not within the "scope" or the "grasp" of such court.27
Notwithstanding what may have been the legal abilities of probate
judges under previous constitutions, upon sound legal analysis of
Section 1, Art. VI of the 1875 Constitution, was there tenable legal
basis for denying to probate courts plenary equitable jurisdiction in
probate matters for which statutory procedure was provided? For
such section provided, "The judicial power of the state, as to matters
of law and equity, except as in this Consitution otherwise provided,
shall be in a Supreme Court .... Probate Courts." The only limita-
tion of such judicial power of the probate courts was that in Section
34 of such Article which provided that it could be exercised only in
"matters pertaining to probate business," and that in Section 35 which
provided that the jurisdiction be "uniform" throughout the state.
Hence, it would seem that the sporadic pronouncements denying or
greatly restricting probate court equity jurisdiction in probate matters
were court made law-not law made by the people either by their
constitution or legislative enactments. Considered a strict legal per-
spective, it would seem that there might well have been much support
for a contention that any question of the wisdom of probate court
jurisdiction over matters of equity indisputably pertaining to probate
business was foreclosed against both the judiciary and legislature by
the express resolution of the constitution. But consideration of that
question here need not extend that far.
Of course, the limitation in Section 34 did leave some scope for
25. While our circuit courts have always had concurrent "jurisdiction over the
establishment of all claims or demands against the estates of decedents" (Barnes
v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 355 Mo. 1136, 1138, 199 S.W.2d 917, 918 (1947)), the
number of such actions filed there have been infinitesimal-a mere smidgen-
immeasurably small.
26. First Baptist Church v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 326, 335 (1879).
27. Caron v. Old Reliable Gold Mining Co., 12 N.M. 211, 226, 78 Pac. 63, 67
(1904). 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 317, n.36.
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determination by the legislature (or absent that-by the courts) as
to what matters did pertain to probate business. But, if the legislature
makes such a determination-and it does not do violence to reason--
why must not such determination be given force and effect? Express
constitutional grant of equitable power plus not unreasonable statu-
tory determination that a matter was a probate matter would, it seems,
foreclose a contrary conclusion. In short, would not a determination
by either court or legislature that a controversy which necessarily is
involved in the winding up of the affairs of a decedent, is a matter
pertaining to probate business, be a sound determination ?28
Hence, it appears clear that it was the skepticism as to the legal
acumen of the judges which resulted in the so-called doctrine that
probate courts could apply equitable principles but could not try equit-
able issues or grant relief that was purely equitable-of which, as
pointed out in 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 317, Professor Atkinson ob-
served, "On its face at least, proceeding like a court of equity without
being one seems to be a sort of apologetic play-acting,"219 and another
writer called it a "vague abstraction." 30 When the 1945 Constitution
required that thereafter probate judges (except for temporary hold-
overs, now very few) should be lawyers, it destroyed the basis for the
old doctrine denying or restricting equitable jurisdiction, whether the
doctrine was based on legal principles, or merely practicality.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
The observation in Mathews that the probate court may have con-
current jurisdiction with the circuit court to determine the equitable
issues there involved, 31 suggests that consideration be given here to
the extent of such concurrent jurisdiction-in the light of the consti-
tution and the reasoning of Judge Ellison in the cases of Barnes" and
Flynn. 3
The 1875 Constitution provides "The circuit courts shall have...
exclusive jurisdiction in all civil cases not otherwise provided for,
and concurrent and appellate jurisdiction as is or may be provided
28. Even Frech (where both court and briefs of counsel ignored the new code)
stated that the probate court had "power to entertain a suit or proceeding based
upon strictly equitable principles" if "such jurisdiction is expressly conferred by
statute or is necessarily incident to the proper exercise of duties directly imposed."
The new code sections, supra, meet both conditions.
29. Note, 48 YALE L.J. 1273, 1277 (1939).
30. Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. ADT. JuD. Soc'Y 183, 187
(1940).
31. Mathews v. Pratt, 367 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. 1963).
32. Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 355 Mo. 1136, 199 S.W.2d 917 (1947).
33. State ex rel. Lipic v. Flynn, 358 Mo. 429, 215 S.W.2d 446 (1948).
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by law.' 34 The 1945 Constitutional provision is identical except that
in lieu of "as is or may be provided by law" it merely says "as is
provided by law." 35 In at least four 36 court of appeals cases and
three37 Supreme Court cases it has been held or declared that when the
relief sought could be obtained in a discovery proceeding in the pro-
bate court, its jurisdiction over the subject matter was exclusive and
that an action in the circuit court involving the same issues and relief,
no matter when filed, could not be successfully maintained. But that
view in effect was repudiated in Barnes and Lipic.
In Barnes, Judge Ellison pointed out that the probate court's juris-
diction is of two kinds: One, is "administrative and auditorial" func-
tions and the other, its "judicial" functions, particularly those of
adjudicating disputed claims between the estate of third persons. It
is only the first-the administrative and auditorial-function that was
intended to be vested exclusively in the probate court. And there
should be no implication of a withdrawal from the circuit courts of
their anciently invested power to litigate adversary proceedings be-
tween the personal representative of a decedent's estate and persons
claiming against it, unless such intention is clearly shown by the con-
stitutional or statutory provisions in question. Upon such reasoning
in Barnes, it was held that the circuit court had power to pass on a
claim which was not a "premortuary debt or demand" because the
circuit courts had anciently exercised such jurisdiction and there was
no clear showing, in either constitutional or the statutory provisions,
that such jurisdiction was intended to be withdrawn.
The opinion cited with approval Linn County Bank v. Clifton38
which quoted with approval an excerpt from Richardson v. Palmer,31
as follows:
Where a court has possessed and exercised jurisdiction of a
subject matter, even if it were conceded that such jurisdiction
were conferred over it on another court by a subsequent law,
such fact would not oust the jurisdiction of the first court, with-
out the employment in the latter enactment of words of exclusion,
in the absence of any repealing clause.4 0
34. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 22 (1875).
35. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 14, (1945).
36. State ex rel. Lamm v. Lamm, 216 S.W. 332 (Mo. App. 1919); Beck v. Hall,
211 S.W. 127 (Mo. App. 1918); Kerwin v. Kerwin, 204 S.W. 922 (Mo. App. 1918);
Lemp Brewing Co. v. Stecknan, 180 Mo. App. 320, 168 S.W. 226 (1914).
37. In re Frech's Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Mo. 1961); State ex rel. Nute
v. Bruce, 334 Mo. 1107, 70 S.W.2d 854 (1934); Davis v. Johnson, 332 Mo. 417, 58
S.W.2d 746 (1933). The declarations in Frech andNute were pure obiter.
38. 263 Mo. 200, 172 S.W. 888 (1914).
39. 24 Mo. App. 480 (1887).
40. Linn County Bank v. Clifton, 263 Mo. 200, 217, 172 S.W. 388, 393 (1914).
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Judge Ellison, therefore disapproved a rather long line of cases 1
holding the probate court's jurisdiction exclusive in certain classes of
cases, saying of them that they "interpolated" the word "exclusive" in
the constitutional grant of "jurisdiction over all matters pertaining
to probate business." 42 His conclusion was that the circuit court's
jurisdiction to determine "postmortuary" claims against an estate
was concurrent with the probate court's jurisdiction.
Again, in Lipic, Judge Ellison held that the circuit court's juris-
diction to adjudge a case of trover and conversion was concurrent
with the probate court's jurisdiction to hear the same sort of case in
a discovery of assets proceeding, saying that it did not matter whether
the recovery sought was of particular property in specie or the money
value thereof, as in conversion-in either case the probate court would
have jurisdiction in a discovery proceeding and the circuit court would
have an alternative or parallel jurisdiction in either replevin or trover
and conversion. After an exhaustive review of the discovery statutes
the opinion states:
This brings up the question whether a discovery of assets pro-
ceeding in the probate court under our present law is, or may be,
substantially the same as a suit in trover and conversion for the
value of the same assets .... [I] t seems to us the proceeding, in
the probate court to discover assets and the action for conversion
in the circuit court are parallel and do or may involve the same
issue and seek the same relief at the option of Gertrude Wheeler,
admn'x. d. b. n. who instituted both.43
At the inception of the Lipic opinion attention was directed to the
fact that the discovery proceeding was first filed and "is still pending."
After concluding that the jurisdiction of the two courts was con-
current, the court held that the "circuit court is encroaching on the
jurisdiction of the probate court" and prohibited it from proceeding
further with the action pending there. In short, the circuit court could
not exercise its concurrent jurisdiction unless and until the probate
action was dismissed.44
41. "A part of them" said Judge Ellison, being listed in his footnote 2, Barnes
v. Boatmen's Nat'1 Bank, 355 Mo. 1136, 199 S.W.2d 917 (1947).
42. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 34 (1875).
43. State ex rel. Lipic v. Flynn, 358 Mo. 429, 436, 438, 215 S.W.2d 446, 450-51.
44. Whether, after prohibition was made absolute, the circuit court should dis-
miss or merely abate the action there is immaterial here. The pertinent points
here are (1) that the two courts had concurrent jurisdiction of the same issues
and could grant the same relief, and (2) that the circuit court had no power to
proceed upon a showing of the pendency of the "parallel" action in the probate
court. Even though the procedures in the two actions were not identical (the dis-
covery procedure in the probate court no doubt being "exclusive") the jurisdiction
to determine the issues was the same.
When Mathews said that the jurisdiction of the circuit court, even th6ugh con-
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These two opinions are perfectly consistent with each other. Judge
Eager's opinion in Mathews--although expressly reserving a decision
of this question-seems to indicate that if essential to a decision the
court might have held that a proceeding for discovery of assets in the
probate court would have lain in that case, to obtain the same sort of
relief as was sought in the circuit court action. Thus, when the
opinions in these three cases are considered together, it would seem
that practically every adversary proceeding between the estate and
some person claiming against it with respect to the title to any species
of personal property could be the subject matter of litigation in either
the probate court or the circut court, but that, over objection, one
action could not be prosecuted to judgment while the other action
was pending. This conclusion is not only sound technically, but it is
highly practicable and in the public interest, as has been demonstrated
in actual practice.
Experience shows that discovery has provided a "quick method of
bringing property into the estate," or obtaining a money judgment for
conversion, and "expediting" the administration. Obviously, the issues
can be adjudicated far more quickly in the probate court than in an
action in the circuit court. After inquiry or hearing in the discovery
proceeding, the "defendant" (citee) frequently complies with the
judgment of the probate court and promptly delivers the property or
the money proceeds thereof to the estate. In some instances the
"punitive" sections of the discovery statutes have a compelling in-
fluence in this direction. However, the estate may, and sometimes
does, find it advantageous to sue at once in the circuit court-either
in replevin or for damages for trover and conversions; this for one
or more of several reasons. First, it would avoid the risk of appeal
and the resultant two trials in nisi prius courts. Second, the estate
in a replevin action may obtain immediate possession of assets by
putting up a replevin bond, thus protecting itself against the possi-
bility of property being removed from the state before any proceed-
ing-discovery or replevin-could possibly reach trial and judgment.
An estate should not be denied a choice of remedy which would be
available to any other replevin plaintiff.
To distinguish between "purely" equitable issues and those which
are only partially equitable, or those in which merely "equitable
principles" may be applied is frequently quite difficult, if not impos-
current, could "not be foreclosed by probate jurisdiction or proceeding" it is fair
to assume that by the word "proceeding" the author of the opinion meant the over-
all administration proceeding, not a pending specific adversary proceeding between
the same parties involving the same issues as the circuit court action. For if two
such actions are pending one or the other must at least be abated if timely objec-
tion be made, either by motion or answer.
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sible. At least, the bar has found it so-and it apparently is con-
tinuing to find it so-after litigation over the matter for more than a
century. Just how a judge may apply "equitable principles" without
granting or denying equitable relief to some one is not realiy ap-
parent.
Strict adherence to a rule of no jurisdiction of equitable issues
would compel probate courts to refuse jurisdiction of innumerable
equitable controversies, usually small, which customarily are sub-
mitted to it, jurisdiction exercised, and its determination accepted as
final. In some cases, even when appealed to the higher courts, both
courts and the lawyers just assumed that equitable jurisdiction lay in
the probate courts,45 although if there is no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, it was the duty of the court to raise the question sua sponte.
Perhaps the most important of all practical reasons for not denying
probate court concurrent jurisdiction is that a litigant may get a trial
de novo in the circuit court in any case, if he wants it; the rule of no
jurisdiction, if always applied, would force circuit court litigation,
with all its burdens, of even the smallest equitable controversies rather
than permit the usually expeditious procedure thereof in the probate
court; either that or forego judicial determination.
45. See In Te Kaimann's Estate, 229 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1950); Lolordo v. Lacy,
337 Mo. 1097, 88 S.W.2d 353 (1935).
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